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ABSTRACT
The replacement of capital assets in the construction field is
a very complex matter involving factors both internal and external
to the equipment itself. This, coupled with the magnitude of capi-
tal invested, requires a comprehensive approach to replacement deci-
sions if the equipment inventory is to be managed effectively. This
thesis explores the criteria upon which the construction equipment
replacement decision is based in two arenas: commercial construction
and the U. S, Naval Construction Force (NCF). The discussion of
criteria used by commercial companies is complemented with concepts
from the theoretical approach. This theoretical/commercial approach
constitutes a frame of reference by which to compare the criteria
utilized in replacing NCF construction equipment. This treatise
notes that replacement of NCF equipage is based almost solely on one
criteria: age. With the aforementioned theoretical/commercial
approach plus a discussion of the Navy approach and the differences
of its decision environment contrasted to industry as a backdrop,
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
A. UNIVERSAL PROBLEM
Modern civilization has become, gradually through some
phases and at an accelerated rate in others, vastly dependent
upon what is known as capital equipment. Capital equipment is
a term which encompasses all types of durable machinery.
Whether a modern state's economic base is principally industry,
maritime or agriculture, the capital equipment employed is a
primary component. The ongoing need and availability of this
equipment, then, is a basic tenet to the future of that country
and, in a more microeconomic sense, of its component industries
and firms making up those industries. Herein lies the concern
for effective replacement.
Replacement of machinery is a matter involving a myriad of
factors, some external and some internal to the equipment itself.
Replacement is not, in most instances, a result of a singular
dramatic incident; rather it is a function of a gradual succession
of events which lead up to such a decision. Terborgh noted:
Capital goods live out their mortal span in an atmos-
phere of combat, a struggle for life as bitter, as in-
tolerant of weakness, as the tooth and claw of biological
competition ... The denizens of the jungle enjoy a limited
security by reason of the continuity and stability that
prey upon them. Machines, on the contrary, must defend
themselves in a world where new species spring up over-
night, where the landscape is never twice the same, where
the fitful winds of change are never stilled.
There is another contrast between biological and
mechanical competition. In the former, death strikes
suddenly, by violence; in the latter it comes usually

by degrees, through a process that may be defined as
functional degradation. It is a kind of progressive
larceny, by which the everchanging but ever-present com-
petitors of an existing machine rob it of its function,
forcing it bit by bit into lower grade and less valuable
types of service until there remains at last nothing it
can do to justify further existenceo A capital good that
can no longer hold some useful function against competi-
tion is a mechanical cadaver, whether buried or not • . •
In the bloodless warfare of machines, life is taken, as
a rule, by stages. [Refo 31]
That this process is incremental, involving both objective
and subjective factors, adds to the difficulty of its solution.
And because of the number and magnitude of variables impacting,
the replacement decision process must be finely tunedo Watson
noted in Ref . 34> " . . o even the most brilliant intuition
and longest experience are insufficient to handle all the factors
in their proper perspective. This in no way minimizes the use
and value of astute judgment."
The industry with which this thesis is concerned is construc-
tion. The foregoing discussion was not specifically aimed at
this industry but it certainly pertains. If there is one parti-
cular contrast of construction to the general concept of industry,
it is the uniqueness of every project. Whereas most industrial
processes are primarily repetitive in production, construction
is an aggregation of iterative subfunctions (perhaps) to produce
something one-of-a-kind. This makes construction equipment
management even more complex.
There is a one particular phenomenon operating on the current
economy which adds importance to the analysis of every investment
decision studied which warrants mention here. It is the rate of
10

price inflation. For construction equipment, its projected rate
between prices of September 1974 and December 1975 ranges between
165^ and 30^» depending on the type of equipment [Ref. iS]
,
The capital equipment replacement problem, then, is a universal
one. The importance of how successfully it is accomplished is
part of the very lifeblood of an industry. Construction is no
exception.
B. A U. S. NAVY PROBLEM
Construction is, of course, accomplished by many organiza-
tions and firms. There is within the United States Navy a force
whose mission is military construction primarily in support of
U. S. Marine Corps and naval shore operations. Called the Naval
Construction Force (NCF) and composed primarily of Mobile Con-
struction Battalions known commonly as Seabees, accomplishment
of their mission requires an equipment inventory currently
valued at $132 million. Management of this construction equip-
ment entails great complexity.
For the several years prior to 1974, NCF equipment procure-
ments averaged approximately $14 million annually. A given
figure such as this will of course buy less and less equipment
as soaring inflation cuts into the quantity received. Coupled
with this, the Congress appears further apt to decrease defense
spending. In addition, a commensurate decrease in the NCF mission
has not been perceived. A net result of all this is a stepped
up requirement to continually pursue more effective methods to
manage the Navy construction equipment inventory.
11

C. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
As in all industries there are many options involving the
question of capital equipment displacement. It can be done by
overhaul, equipment transfer (from other sites), subcontract,
lease/rent or replacement.
This thesis seeks to address the replacement option as
approached by the Navy Construction Force equipment managers.
More specifically it takes issue with the concept that replace-
ment of Navy construction equipment is almost solely based on
one criterion: age of the equipment. It is considered that
the predominance of the age factor is an oversimplification of
the solution to a complex matter. The question studied: what
are the criteria and other factors, in addition to age, inherent
in the NCF equipment replacement decision?
II. SCOPE AND APPROACH
A. SCOPE
The subject of capital equipment replacement is both a com-
plicated and extensive one. Conceptually it is as long as it
is wide and its implications are far-reaching. Depending on
the equipment intensity of a particular organization or industry,
the replacement problem may be the driving factor in even the
most basic decisions its management makes. In others, equipment
replacement may be a secondary or tertiary decision tenet of
that organization. Regardless, if conducted conscientiously,
the process of implementing an effective equipment replacement
12

program is not a simple one—it covers, rather, a spectrum from
being mildly complicated to very complicated.
This study does not pretend to analyze all aspects of every
capital asset replacement problem. To do so, obviously, would
inundate the reader with works on the magnitude of a fair-sized
library. This work is, however, a conceptual look at the deci-
sion factors pertinent to replacement of one type of physical
asset, namely, construction equipment o Unlike some general
classes of equipment (e.g., automotive), the use of construction
equipment is limited to a particular industry. The industry
itself is a multi-faceted one. However, upon investigation
one finds that, varied as the industry is, there are certain
matters regarding equipment replacement which are common through-
out. As mentioned below there are both theoretical and practical
approaches which have been studied in order to develop a profile
or benchmark by which to compare an even more specific area of
asset replacement. That subject area is the approach utilized
by the U. S. Navy in the ongoing inventory management of the
Naval Construction Force's (NCF) construction equipment.
There are several assumptions at the base of the study which
should be noted at the outset. First, the need for the equipment
is assumed to be one of an ongoing nature. It does not attempt
to validate the equipment requirement. This implies that the
NCF mission is long-term and parallels the concept in the com-
mercial world of a "going concern." To the knowledge of the
author, this assumption is unquestionably valid.
13

Secondly, the primary area considered deals with acquisition
of capital equipment which will serve to replace assets previously
held in the inventory. In a sense this is related to the premise
above in that it is downstream from initial acquisition or
initial need development. It is the process which Terborgh
terms "primary replacement" which cites new acquisition vis-a-vis
replacement by equipment under the same ownership, say, from
another jobsite [Ref,32], In the NCF equipment management environ-
ment, it was found that this "primary replacement" was the principal
area of emphasis. Accordingly, this premise is considered
supportableo
The third assumption is that the equipment inventory for a
given equipment code (ECC) or family or class has a relatively
even-age distribution. This, in effect, minimizes the effect an
"age hump" has on management of certain ECC, Due to the Naval
Construction Force build-up for Vietnam, Seabee equipment unfor-
tunately does not currently fit this profile in many equipment
codes; some are "humped" with old equipment. Accordingly,
this assumption is not as incontrovertible as the aforementioned.
It is admittedly self-serving in that it serves to dampen the
predominant impact of the age factor on the replacement decision.
The Civil Engineer Support Office (CESO) of the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) manages the entire fleet
of civil engineer support equipment for the Navy, This equipment
inventory includes both automotive and construction codes. The
subject of equipment replacement criteria is equally applicable
14

to both of these types of equipment o There have been numerous
studies conducted and reams of reports written concerning auto-
motive assets and their replacement both by commercial and
government groups. The sheer numbers of automotive units, their
highly visible service, general type of use and cyclicality are
reasons for the intense study received. In contrast, construc-
tion equipment studies were not found to be that common. Cer-
tainly the capital invested would point to a need for comprehensive
study.
There are many types of construction equipment for the myriad
of specialized tasks of building. The field is further complicated
by the many variables encountered in the type of use to which an
equipment unit may be subjected (soil conditions, maintenance
support, operator quirks, remote location, etc). These all
preclude development of replacement theory which would espouse
general applicability. Even a study of the small segment the
NCF performs in the overall construction industry spectrum encom-
passes nearly all variableso Such is the nature of .the industry.
Hence, the tenor of this thesis is the discussion of factors
which affect replacement and how they are considered conceptually
in equipment replacement deliberations.
B. RESEARCH APPROACH
There were three basic areas from which information was
sought: theoretical, industry and the Navy. They were not
mutually exclusive by any means. Theory was extracted from the
written word of library and technical publications. As one
15

might expect there was considerable writing on the general
subject of capital assets which dealt mostly with industrial
plant equipage. Material specific to replacement acquisition
of equipment used in construction was relatively scarce.
The next area researched was the criteria used by industry
and was composed of two sub-areas: equipment manufacturing
concerns and construction companies. Equipment companies were
interviewed in order to include both the seller and marketer
views on replacement. The contacted manufacturers built weight-
handling, paving and the top-of-the-line earth-moving equipment.
Information was further developed from construction companies
operating on an international basis through interviews with
managers and assistant managers of the equipment and tool
procurement. In respect for privacy and in accordance with
explicit requests, the companies will not be further identified.
These theoretical and industry concepts are discussed in Chapter
III, As will be developed in Chapter IV, there are numerous
and extensive managing and operating differences bet.ween industry
and the Navy, The basic problem of equipment replacement is,
however, mutual. The information from theory and industry coupled
with these differences provide a means of comparison from which
to analyze the criteria utilized in managing NCF equipment.
The management organization of the NCF construction equip-
ment was the third and principal area of research. Such robust
organizations as Congress and the President's Office of Management
and Budget which are so far-flung from the actual replacement
16

decision, yet which impact so heavily on such matters, stack
the management system vdth many vertical layers. This study
concerned itself primarily, however, with the actual decision-
making agency (CESO) and its handling of the parameters laid
on it from above. Information was obtained through discussions
with Naval officers and civilians tasked with the decision to
replace. They are listed in Appendix A. Criteria and factors
upon which Navy construction equipment replacement decisions
are based are discussed in Chapter V,
The task remaining to be accomplished is a comparison and
evaluation of those replacement criteria cited and used in
theory and industry and in the Navy, Based on that analysis,
recommendations are made regarding which criteria are pertinent
to NCF equipment replacement decisions,
III. THEORETICAL/COMMERCIAL APPROACH
As noted in preceding chapters, the main thrust of this
treatise is to analyze the particular criteria used by the U, S,
Navy in supplying replacements for the construction equipment
in the Naval Construction Force inventory. In order to provide
a base line for such a discussion, concepts extrapolated from
references listed in the Bibliography and from the aforementioned
industry interviews are cited herein.
17

A. THE CONCEPT OF "ECONOMIC LIFE"
1, Definition
Within management, "economic life" is a common considera-
tion which dwells right at the center of many far-reaching deci-
sions. For a given physical asset under deliberation, its economic
life could encompass many different factors depending on the area
of responsibility of the one studying it. Consider the simplistic
example of a bulldozer which is owned by A and rented to B for
a certain project. To A, the prime economic life consideration
regarding the equipment is the entire cost and revenue profile
of that dozer over an extended period of time. This must include
not only the costs and income derived from B's use of the tractor
and those of other users but also the ongoing costs which must
be paid irrespective of whether the bulldozer is being rented.
Thus, the economic life factors of the owner's equipment decision
are more comprehensive and longer range than those of the temporary
user. In contrast, B must be concerned with the economics of
using a bulldozer over the short haul, figuratively -speaking.
Assuming the tractor is the one best-suited to accomplish the
task, the machine-hours estimate becomes the basis of the "life"
of the dozer by B's definition. The economic factors he must
weigh are concerned with whether or not he should rent from A
(or from some other lessor) or buy the bulldozer himself. The
point is, the subject of economic life can wear a coat of many
colors. To submit definitions without full description of the
decision environment is, admittedly, over-simplification. This
la

notwithstanding, as further preface to the matter of the equip-
ment replacement subject, several definitions follow.
In his study, Douglas [Ref, 30] defined economic life
as ** • • • the age at replacement, in years, that maximizes the
profits returned to the owner. Since a chain of replacements
is involved (normally), the economic life pertains to a class
of equipment rather than to a specific piece of equipment,"










FIGURE 1. ECONOMIC LIFE OF EQUIPMENT
He went on to observe that " , , , the life that maximizes profits
is considerably less than the maximum that will still earn a
profit for the owner," Watson cited the period which results in
a "total capital recovery cost (primarily depreciation and equip-
ment acquisition interest expense) and operating cost for a range
of service lives • • <> that will yield minimum annual cost,"







FIGURE 2. DETERMINATION OF ECONOMIC LIFE
Caterpillar, in their Equipment Economics study, described the
key to the most economical replacement time as "whether the
cumulative cost per hour becomes progressively higher or lower
with added machine hours." [Ref. 7]
Thuesen described economic life as "the time interval
that minimizes the asset's total equivalent annual costs or
maximizes its annual revenues" and equated this to the "optimum
replacement interval." He went on to warn, however, "(that)
rarely is the economic life used to determine how frequently
an asset should be replaced. Several reasons. First "the economic
life is valid as a replacement only under the restrictive assump-
tion that all future replacements are the same as the replacement
under consideration with regard to first cost, salvage value,
operating expenses and net income produced. Second, reasonably
good data describing the costs of an asset are rarely available
at the time of its purchase. A third reason is that the decision
to retire an asset is not usually made at the time of purchase
• • • due to factors in existence shortly before the time of
20

replacement," [Ref, 33] It is noted, then, that deriving the
economic life of an asset does not in itself solve the replace-
ment question. There are factors which impinge upon the matter
which disallow the decision being made "in a vacuum." How
effectively these factors are considered is dependent on the
approach applied by management.
2, Approach
Due to the magnitude of the capital investment involved,
equipment replacement decisions must be conducted in a managed
arena. As Hackamack observed in Ref. 11, "... the first crucial
step toward the efficient handling of replacement programs is
obtaining recognition of top management that replacement problems
do exist and that they should be handled on a systematic basis."
He is convinced that an effective modernization program should
accomplish the following:
ao Alert management to profitable replacement opportunities,
bo Collect data that are pertinent to the decision.
c. Estimate the profitability of the proposal.
d. Determine the need for funds and the funds available.
e. Select the best investment opportunities for the
available funds.
There are, of course, numerous factors to discuss with
which management must deal in approaching the matter of equipment
replacement. At the leading edge is one which was discussed
earlier as a basic assumption to this thesis but nonetheless
bears reiteration—the question of the need. Information must
be developed v/hich describes in finite terms the need or require-
ment for which the equipment is proposed. Without a firm grasp
of this matter the resultant decision will be a futile exercise.
21

Related to this is the fact that every requirement study-
regarding construction equipment will be a unique one. The same
analysis should not be used for every prospective equipment deci-
sion but rather should be tailored to meet the demands of the
particular situation [Ref. 11]. In developing a format for a
general approach, it certainly should be designed to satisfy the
conditions unique to the company's operations [Ref, 13] • Like-
vd-se, Watson cited requirements which he believed each equipment
analyst must accomplish:
a. Choose an evaluation method which best suits his needs,
b. Choose the cost components that are applicable to the
particular replacement problem,
0, Determine the availability and accuracy of the components,
d. Determine the future value of the components,
e. Combine the necessary components into a series of costs




Combine future operating costs with capital recovery
costs to determine the economic life of the project,
g. Select an acceptable rate of return to calculate the
project payoff, [Ref, 34]
Knowledge of the equipment is an obvious necessity. It
must be recognized also that, as Watson notes, " , • • there is
a distinction between deteriorating or 'diminishing efficiency'
equipment and sudden failure of 'constant efficiency' equipment
• , , The lifetimes of the former can be extended indefinitely
if their parts are repaired or replaced as necessary," [Ref, 34]
Construction equipment is of the "diminishing efficiency" type
and deliberations regarding its management must reflect this




Management is in a position to consider the reason for
a given equipment replacement and should do so explicitly. In
Ref. 11, Hackamack cited eight economic reasons:
a. Produce better products,
b. To remain in competitive position,
c. To increase output,
d. To provide stockholders with a greater return on
investment,
e« To cut maintenance costs,
f
,
To reduce waste and the scrap factor,
g. To lower direct labor costs,
h. To reduce work-in-process inventories.
He further noted four non-economic reasons which are not
necessarily mutually exclusive of the foregoing:
a. Improving the safety of an operation,
b. Reducing the human-error factor,
c. Increasing the efficiency of operations,
d. Increasing the adaptability of equipment.
This list, is not all-inclusive. Depending on an organization's
goals or mission, the decision basis could be one or a combina-
tion of factors. Whatever the case, it should be known at the
outset and explicitly handled.
It is noted in summary there are no rigid formulae, no
cookbook instructions which guarantees to management that their
selected approach will even be effective, let alone the optimal.
The judgment they exercise is indeed paramount
o
B, REPLACEMENT ALTERNATIVES
One facet of the construction equipment replacement problem
warrants discussion at this point. The tenor of this thesis pre-
supposes that replacement equipment will be acquired to meet a
future construction need and endeavors to cite criteria which
23

deal with particulars of the question. There are, however,
several basic alternatives to procuring new equipment which
justify mention.
One obvious alternative to buying is renting or leasing
equipment. Commonly, a company will opt for this solution when
faced with a limited use requirement for a particularly high
cost unit. Without doubt, the major factors involved here are
the period of required use and availability of capital. Another
option akin to the lease/rent one is to subcontract the task,
Sound, realistic management of equipment resources is a
necessity and effective construction scheduling can preclude
the requirement to acquire new equipment. This can apply on
both an inter- and intra-project basis. This includes shuttling
equipment from jobsite to jobsite; it also encompasses the con-
cept of determining what other types of equipment in the existing
inventory can be used for the given task.
Another alternative solution is to repair or overhaul the
existing asset. The typical design of today's construction equip-
ment encompasses a myriad of subassemblies. Upgrading of the
basic unit through repair and/or replacement of these components
produces a viable option indeed. Undoubtedly, there are thousands
of construction units in operation currently where the only evi-
dence of its real age is the old chassis. In light of the current
accelerating inflation rate, the attractiveness of this alternative
continues to grow.




C. CRITERIA AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
There are many factors of varying complexity and impact
which must be dealt with in making sound construction equipment
replacement decisions. As a result of researching theoretical
works and commercial practice, eight factors are considered
particularly relevant to the type of decision in question. These
factors, which are listed and discussed under "Criteria" below,
are not meant to represent an all-inclusive list for every replace-
ment decision for development of such a list is considered by
this writer an impossible task due to the wide spectrum of use
of construction equipment. This notwithstanding, sound manage-
ment requires development of a systematic listing of all factors
relevant to a given decision. There are other matters which
are also important to these replacement decisions which are dis-
cussed in the subsequent section. Admittedly, there is a fine
line between criteria and "other factors" and the distinction
is not considered an important one,
1, Criteria
a. Age
On the surface, age is a seemingly uncomplicated
matter to consider. Each specific unit of equipment has an age
which should be readily extractable from even the simplest record
system. In many organizations age may be the key, perhaps even
the sole, factor in a given equipment replacement decision.
The equipment inventory manager must be aware of the implications
of the age listed for equipment under deliberation.
25

Age is normally based on the manufacturer's date
of issue, i.e., the model year. Assuming it was acquired for
a specific immediate need and was received directly from the
factory (as in the case of many equipment orders placed by
large construction companies) for continuing use, age is indeed
simple. There are, however, cases where the purchase was via
a dealer's showroom where it may have been for, say, a year.
In essence then the books may show a one-year-old machine which
was, practically speaking, brand-new. As will be discussed in
Chapter V, the Navy has a similar consideration because some
of its new equipment goes directly into a mobilization inventory
to be held in readiness for several years prior to being rotated
for use. It is seen, then, that non-use or delayed use of new
equipment can distort its age.
Another way in which age is measured is the number
of hours or miles logged on its metero This is a more valid
yardstick to the equipment manager in that it supplies him more
meaningful data regarding that equipment's particular history.
Commonly, age records show both chronological age in years and
use-age in hours or miles.
Related to this is the age either in years and/or
in hours or miles allowed by the Internal Revenue Service for
depreciation write-off. Understandably, this factor is always
a prime consideration in commercial construction. Close com-
parison of the actual usage versus the corresponding depreciation
allowed is a key to effectively managing the equipment on hand.
26

Good analysis of that data is an essential input to the decision
of when to replace these existing assets.
Due, at least in part, to its ease in identification
and derivation, age is ofttimes the single criteria used to
"flag" equipment for study in a given replacement cycle. If
such a criteria is necessary to a management approach, it is
as valid as any. It should, however, be tempered for as Terborgh
notes in his initial MAPI book, "... no productive facility
should be exempt from challenge (replacement consideration)
merely because of its youth." [Ref . 32]
Age is an essential criteria in equipment replace-
ment. The components which are inherent in its definition must
be recognized by the equipment manager and weighed in light of
his decision environment.
b. Obsolescence
Thuesen stated in Ref. 33 that there are two basic
reasons for considering replacement of a physical asset: physical
impairment (which will be discussed in the next section) and
obsolescence. He said obsolescence "... occurs as a result
of the continuous improvement of equipment. Often the rate of
improvement is so great that it is an economy to replace a
physical asset in good operating condition with an improved
unit." Caterpillar defined obsolescence as "the result of in-
efficiencies of a presently owned machine relative to a replace-
ment machine with technical improvement." [Ref. 7]. Terborgh
noted that it must be defined not in terms of age or decrepitude,
27

but rather as a "matter of relativity, not an attribute of
the asset itself.** [Refo 32]
The weight of obsolescence in the replacement deci-
sion process is a function of competition as perceived by the
commercial construction executive, Hackamack described a
primary ** • . • problem concerning equipment replacement is
that an old machine will probably still function as effectively
as it did when it was new but the fact remains that technological
advances in productivity may have outmoded it. The cost of
production on old machines increases or remains the same; how-
ever, competitors may have incorporated the benefits of lower
production costs through utilization of new equipment with the
latest technology.** [Ref. 11]
Obsolescence is a concept which is relatively
easy to understand but difficult to quantify. The writer en-
countered only one observed estimate of an obsolescence cycle
for any type of construction equipment. During an interview
with an equipment company representative, he noted that new
breakthroughs on bulldozer design occurred approximately every
five to six years.
Obsolescence is a measure of factors external to
the equipment. It is subjective in nature. Not unlike other
criteria and factors discussed herein, this element serves to
highlight the requirement for a firm grasp of the entire replace-





The term physical impairment is considered self-
descriptive. Depending on the type of construction equipment
in question, measurement of physical impairment can be a simple
or not-so-simple task. In contrast to the aforementioned
obsolescence, this trait is internal to the machine. It can
deal a machine a single swift, traumatic blow or it can, as
Terborgh said, "take its life by stages by a kind of progressive
larceny.** [Ref. 32]
A major equipment accident at a construction site
is a common example of instantaneous physical impairment. The
magnitude of cost to repair these machines relative to initial
cost often makes the decision to replace (vis-a-vis repair) a
simple one. Indeed, some organizations have percentage cost
to repair and age relationships set as a matter of policy
guidance to the equipment manager. A corollary to this is that
one construction company interviewed carries "total damage in-
surance" and through its claims liquidation repairs the damaged
equipment. The decision it is then faced with is whether to
retain or sell subsequent to the insurance-paid repair. A quirk
of this criteria is that it often answers the question when to
replace but leaves unanswered the question of whether to replace.
The other aspect of physical impairment is much more
subtleo It is the "progressive larceny" to which Terborgh
referred o It is a gradual happening which "may lead to a decline
in value of service rendered, increased operating costs, increased
29

maintenance costs or a combination** according to Thuesen [Ref, 33].
Because of its subtlety the costs associated with this physical
impairment must be monitored continuously to be managed effectively.
Normally the maintenance costs will plot as a continuous curve
for an equipment group. As such the curve must be inspected
for trends as it is plotted separately and in combination with
other costs (e.g., owning and operating costs). Analysis of
such trends is essential to the replacement question. Indeed,
in its treatise on equipment economics. Caterpillar cites the
cost of maintenance and repair as **the largest single operating
expense for earthmoving equipment.*' [Ref. 7]
There is a case which falls between the two previously
mentioned. There are times when an extensive repair or overhaul
is contemplated which is a result of prolonged useo It is, as
was noted earlier in this chapter, an alternative to replacement,
d. Performance
The concept of performance or productivity is another
factor which is necessarily at the heart of replacement delibera-
tions. It is a function of factors both internal and external
to the machine, a fact which adds somewhat to the complexity of
its analysis.
The internal factors relate to the built-in capacities
of the machine and how well engineered the component parts are
married to the overall designed output. It deals also with the
quality of workmanship with which it is built.
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There is a factor which is both internal and external.
It is the effectiveness of the man-machine interface considerations
designed into the unit which abet its operation toward the designed
maximum. It is of no use to have the highest capacity machine on
site without an operator with corresponding ability or experience.
This operator training, which is only indirectly related to the
machine, can affect its productivity significantly. This is
stating the obvious, but nevertheless operator training must be
considered. One construction company interviewed indicated that
in their equipment acquisition deliberations they explicitly
sought the "top-of-the-line" equipment due to the physhological
aspects of obtaining maximum output from both man and machine.
Another machine-external facet which requires con-
sideration is how well suited the selected equipment is for the
job. This, too, has significant effect on a unit's productivity.
Judgment of this type is possible only with knowing equipment
lives and project requirements and conditions in detail. The
manager of a central equipment inventory is unfortunately not
always able to accomplish such a detailed approach. There is
assistance available, however, from either his field staff or
from equipment company representatives who will study job
requirements and recommend equipment accordingly.
One final point on productivity relates to the terms
of study: both long-run and short-run data should be analyzed.
Of particular importance in both the long and short is the ton
per hour or cubic yard per hour moved and the attendant costs.
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In addition, the amount of down-time logged over the long-run
bears constant monitoring. Taking into account the site and
working conditions, any dovmturn in the former or upturn in the
latter would be significant in any replacement deliberation.
e. Resale
It was noted in research that one particular criteria
was emphasized tepidly in the theoretical texts but very obviously
considered a dominant factor in industry practice when both the
construction companies and equipment manufacturers discuss re-
placement. It is the equipment's resale value. It should be
a consideration in equipment selection as well as in the decision
of when to replace.
As noted in one equipment management handbook, for
many owners " o . . potential resale or trade-in value is a key
factor in their purchasing decisions, since this is a means of
reducing the investment they must recover through depreciation
charges o High resale value . • • can reduce hourly depreciation
charges, lower total hourly owning costs and improve the owner's
competitive position." [Ref. 5]
The equipment resale subject can best be summarized
in Figure 3 on the next page. It plots used bulldozer auction
prices as a percentage of their original list price based on
sales at 43 Forke Brothers auctions in 26 states in 1973. The
bulldozer class shown covers such models as International Har-
















FIGURE 3. USED EQUIPMENT AUCTION PRICES
As can be seen, price differences and therefore cost recoupments
can be significant when comparing equipment makes particularly
in the early years,
f. Need
This criteria has been discussed previously. At the
risk of redundancy, it is noted here for emphasis. Suffice it
to say that no sound equipment replacement decision can be
reached v/ithout comprehensive study of the need for which the
equipment is proposed.
g. Availability of Money
Perhaps because it is a very general factor which
is external in nature to the equipment itself, the availability
of procurement funds is not treated comprehensively at all in
any of the references. For similar reasons, its treatment here
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will be likewise. This approach, however, should not subordinate
its importance. There are numerous factors which affect the
availability of funds which can be attributable to either the
organization or economic climateo They will not be discussed
here. It should be noted, nonetheless, that there are questions
regarding procurement funds such as how obtained, in what amount,
when available and at what cost that must be answered in the
replacement deliberations early on. The import of such matters
cannot be overstated when replacing capital assets,
ho Cost of the Equipment
There are two basic categories of costs relating to
physical assets; ownership and operating/maintenance. As noted
previously when discussing economic life, minimizing the combined
total of these costs is a prime tenet of effective equipment
management. To achieve this the equipment manager must be fully
knowledgeable of cost make-up.
Ownership includes such costs as initial price of
unit and attachments, delivery, and installation. In developing
and analyzing cost information, other factors such as depreciation
method, resale, overhaul and disassembly costs must also be con-
sidered. Operating and maintenance costs are the recurring costs
which are required to keep the unit producing. They include such
items as operator wages, fuel, lubrication, repair parts, license,
insurance, and taxes [Ref. 34].
Too often the initial acquisition price dominates
the cost analysis phase of the replacement decision. It is
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considered, however, that the complete analysis must consider
all costso The basis of Life Cycle Costing discussed in Ref • 9
embraces such a concept and is endorsed by the writer. Certainly
the magnitude in toto of all of the cost factors should emphasize
their importance to the equipment manager,
2, Other Considerations
As noted previously, the line between decision elements
listed as "criteria" and "other" is a fine one, perhaps even
blurred. Nevertheless, factors on the periphery of the replace-
ment decision are important to note and can have significant
impact on both the means and the end of the process.
Equipment life figures set by policy or other means
for certain classes of equipment are important base lines for
many replacement decisions. As noted earlier it can be the
"flag" to identify a unit for considerationo Thus, its importance
lies in the fact that it can be a front-end input to the replace-
ment problem as a particular unit enters the inventory. It is
not to be mistaken as a driving factor in replacement- for to
do so overrides other factors which require analysis.
Use of the equipment has been discussed herein several
times previously. The approach taken was concerned with its
primary tasks immediately following procurement. Consideration
of assignments following completion of the initial one are also
of real importance. Secondary applications of older equipment
to lighter tasks can often reap significant economies. The
problem is, of course, the inability to foresee equipment
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requirements several years dovmstream. For a given decision,
however, old equipment in the current inventory, similar to
that under replacement consideration, may be a viable alternative
to a new equipment buy for some tasks.
Another factor is the procurement method utilized to
replace the construction assets. Commercial firms utilize
whatever method will maximize their benefits. Some organizations
are required to procure equipment by certain methods as will be
noted in Chapter V on the Navy approach. It is significant in
that it precludes consideration of many factors which do indeed
warrant consideration. It is a key to whether equipment procured
in a given buy and in follow-on replacements will be of the same
makeo Maintaining the equipment "string" of the same make has
important consequences in the repair parts support required, a
factor which is further emphasized by equipment used in remote
locations. The method also reflects the priority of considerations
given to cost factors©
The type and reliability of cost data available upon
which to base replacement decisions is important and is found
to be a matter of concern to some theorists. In discussing
maintenance costs, Mayer noted caustically that "... routine
maintenance is a very straight forward operation, and theoreti-
cally, the amount of labor and material expended ... can be
measured. But any procedure developed to provide this information
would entail so much administrative and clerical time that the
value would be more than offset by the cost of procuring them."
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[Ref o 12] Still, good data must be kept if analysis of existing
equipment is to provide the basis for replacing with new equip-
ment. The American Trucking Association's report said candidly,
"Making management decisions based on erroneous information
which one considers factual is more dangerous than knowingly
making decisions based upon guesswork or intuition." [Ref, 3]
Compilation of comprehensive, reliable data should be conceivably
easier with computerization, where available.
These, then, are the decision elements which warrant
deliberation when replacing equipment,
D. METHODS
It is the criteria input of construction equipment replace-
ment decisions v/hich is the concern of this thesis, not the
determination of methods and formulae to which these criteria
should be applied. It is considered, however, that at least a
listing of some of the more widely acclaimed methods and formulae
is in order. All methods cited point toward the replacement of
capital equipment assets in general except for the Douglas Model
which deals specifically with equipment used in the construction
field,
lo Productivity Criteria Quotient (PCQ)
2o Payoff Period
3. Rate of Return
4. Present ¥orth
5. Annual Cost




10. IBM Augmented Investors
11. Intuition or Hunch
12. Douglas Construction Equipment Model
13 • Reeves Electronic Analogue Computer Analysis (REAL)
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Methods 1 through 6 are discussed by Hackamack in Ref o 11 and
Watson discusses methods 2 through 11 in his work [Ref. 34].
The Douglas Model was developed in Refo 30; REAL was cited by-
Rand in Ref. 26.
IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND NAVY CONSTRUCTION
The final chapter deals with the comparison of the construction
equipment replacement prescribed in theory and the commerical
world with that used by the NCF and includes recommendations to
enhance the effectiveness of the Navy system. There are, however,
many differences between the theoretical/commerical construction
arena and that of the Navyo Toward lending "real-world" credibility
to this treatise, such differences are discussed briefly herein.
A. SPECIFIC JOB VERSUS GENERAL MISSION
In a very basic sense, the approach to construction equipment
replacement is a function of the organization's whole reason for
being, be it a commercial construction company or unit of the
NCF. Commercial companies gear up for an equipment acquisition
looking toward an upcoming project to build as opposed to a
unit-by-unit replacement process per se. The buyer knows the
specific use for which the equipment will be used; he can tailor
his equipment requirement list to that future job. This is the
short-term effect. In the long run he faces an uncertain, fluc-




In contrast, the Navy equipment manager is concerned primarily
with maintaining an equipment capability for contingency or
emergency needs as opposed to projects to be built on specific
upcoming Seabee battalion deployments. His approach is more
general; he must consider mobility and flexibility along with
the remoteness of operation inherent in such planning. On the
other hand, the workload his equipment must support is relatively
stable, predictable and insensitive to economic conditions.
Bo FUNDING AND PROCUREMENT ENVIRONMENTS
Relative to the Navy process, the funding and procurement
aspects of a replacement buy in industry is compact and unencum-
bered. One reason for this is that a construction company buys
equipment in advance of a given project. At the outset of an
equipment acquisition deliberation, the industry manager is
aware of the amount of money available. If such an analysis
is necessary to his approach to the matter, he has the where-
withal to rank alternative makes and models and execute the
acquisition accordingly. Because all costs related to equipment
are centralized, his analysis can integrate initial price, resale,
operating and maintenance costs to support his ranking.
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V, his Navy
counterpart is considerably more constrained. Federal funding
is appropriated on an annual basis vice being project-specific
which can cause considerable delay between the time the replace-
ment determination is made and receipt of the equipment. In
addition, he manages Navy equipment via two different types of
39

funds. One is specified for procurement only; the other is for
operating the equipment o The problem precipitated by this is
his not being able to combine funds in his analysis. Another
matter is the requirement to buy through formal advertising.
The Navy manager will have to accept the low bid regardless of
how that vendor's equipment may have ranked with the alternatives.
Thus, he is denied choosing the replacement model. The Navy
equipment manager is also affected, significantly at times, by
the prevailing political atmosphere. As an example, a require-
ment to fund at the same level every year for a given period
seems to be the present vogue. While this minimizes some un-
certainty (regarding the target figure for which to budget) it
is not necessarily the most cost effective way to manage an
equipment inventoryo It further stresses what was heard by
the writer several times in interviewing the Navy managers,
"Money is the driver in the replacement process." These matters
are discussed more comprehensively in the next chapter.
C. RENT/LEASE VERSUS BUY
The discussion of the option of renting or leasing as opposed
to buying construction equipment will be succinct. In the com-
mercial world of construction the rent/lease option is not only
available but often chosen. It is not the intent of this work
to probe the many reasons, supportable and otherwise, why the




A related matter is that of depreciation which the Navy is
not concerned with since it does not pay taxeso However, a con-
struction company which pays taxes in the 50^ bracket is. The
impact on its equipment management is that with all other things
equal the pay-off period of a unit of equipment in industry is
twice that of the same unit bought in the Navy.
D. VALUATION OF OUTPUT
In industry, the measure of effectiveness or achievement
is often profits earned. It is a measurable thing. The cost
of inputs, such as construction equipment costs, can be related
to profit singularly or in an integrated manner and in so doing
their contribution can be appraised objectively. The point is
that a measurement can be made.
In comparison, the worth of the NCF mission is in terms of
"the public good" which is subjective, a value judgment. Accord-
ingly, the costs of components supporting that mission, which
are measurable, cannot be related to the benefits derived. The
process lacks a meaningful method to assess benefits gained
from costs incurred.
E. COMPETITION
The contrast of the concept of competition between commercial
and Navy construction is a vivid one. It is the name of the
game in the construction industry and impacts on nearly every
management decision made, including those relating to replacing
capital assets. In comparison, the NCF operates primarily as a
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single source with no organizations apparently competing for
its mission. Accordingly, competiveness is not a factor in cost-
effectiveness analysis of construction equipment replacement in
the Navy.
F. MAGNITUDE OF OPERATION
This final difference is one which has an indirect effect
on a given organization. To develop a comparison of one company's
size to that of the NCF would serve no purpose. It is noted,
however, that the magnitude and remoteness of the construction
equipment supporting the Seabees is considerable. The equipment
inventory numbers 7600 units deployed at any given time from
Diego Garcia to Davisville, from Alaska to Antarctica, The point
to be considered is that the magnitude and dispersal alone can
prompt considerations in replacement that otherwise might not be
necessary,
V, THE NAVY APPROACH
The two preceding chapters discussed the theory and commercial
practice aspects of construction equipment replacement and noted
the major differences between the nature of construction in
industry and in the NCF. This chapter discusses organization,





lo The Civil Engineer Support Equipment Inventory (CESE)
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVEAC) manages





do CNO Special Projects
e. Reserve Mobilization
fo Reserve Peacetime
The equipment utilized by these components known as Civil Engieer
Support Equipment (CESE) includes motor vehicles, construction,
weight-handling, railroad, firefighting and miscellaneous mobile
equipment [Ref. 22], The total value of the CESE inventory is
$717 million and numbers over 67,000 unitsc This thesis is
I
concerned with those forces making up the NCF (see Appendix B)
shown as Active Forces, These forces utilize an equipment in-
ventory valued at $132 million which is supported by another
$S7 million worth of equipment in ready stock,
2o Prepositioned War Reserve Stock (PWRS)
One aspect of the management of Navy CESE is the utiliza-
tion of an inventory of mobilization equipment known as the Pre-
positioned War Reserve Stock (PWRS), This ready stock is located
on both coasts to ensure a construction capability to support
both Navy and Marine Corps operations on an emergency basis.
It is a sizable, valuable asset which, as a secondary benefit,
allows some flexibility in regard to management of Navy CESE,
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One Naval officer contacted noted that basically all
new CESE was rotated through P¥RSo As noted in Refo 23, "PWRS
operates as a revolving account in which stock is rotated out
to meet customer demands and replaced using (procurement) fundso"
PWRS equipment through-put is on a first-in, first-out basis.
In addition to Navy units, other government agencies may acquire
PWRS equipment assuming such an acquisition would not detrimentally
affect the Navy readiness postureo When this occurs, the funds
are transferred to CESO to cover the cost based on a replacement
cost estimate vice what was actually paid for that specific equip-
ment; these funds are used to acquire replacement equipment.
The advantages of PWRS equipment through-put are numerous.
It reduces PWRS inventory average age and in so doing improves
the overall state-of-the-art of the construction equipment readi-
ness capability. In recent years, NAVEAC has not received pro-
curement funds for new PWRS equipage precipitating a situation
which would produce an obsolete mobilization stock in a relatively
short period o Rotating new equipment through PWRS allows a con-
tinual inventory upgrading [Ref. 23]. Another advantage is the
immediate delivery time to the fleet unit. This can be signifi-
cant as one CESO officer noted that there is a two-year lead-
time from authorization and funding to actual delivery in some
types of equipment
o
There are disadvantages. There is an inherent lag in
the equipment state-of-the-art when it is received in the fleet
several years after manufacture. Equipment managers tend to
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discount this obsolescence being a major factor in NCF con-
struction due to non-existence of competitive forces. Another
disadvantage is that consideration of the PWS system in the
replacement decision tends to make the process which is already
cumbersome even more so. Along these lines, the advantages seem
to outweigh the disadvantages.
Netting it all out, it is noted that PWRS equipment
through-put increases the flexibility of the Navy replacement
decision maker,
3, The Civil Engineer Support Office (CESO)
NAVFAC discharges its equipment management responsibility
through its Civil Engineer Support Office (CESO), Accordingly,
CESO provides centralized procurement and inventory record main-
tenance [Ref, 23], That it is the central manager is a signifi-
cant point for it was noted that "CESE will be viewed as one
Navy wide program with one inventory and one inventory objective
vice three autonomous entities consisting of Shore, NCF and
PWRS," [Ref, 18] Several years ago, criticism was leveled at
the NCF equipment system citing problems which "prevail in the
areas of overlapping jurisdiction of responsible agencies where
accountability cannot be pinned down." [Ref. I6] The current
management system utilized by CESO has solved this problem,
CESO has been called the "alter-ego of NAVFAC" for it
must know what it takes to support the operating forces and
what is the impact of degraded equipment. It must, therefore,
be privy to future project requirements in order to balance
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»support overall [Ref. 27] o It is the decision maker regarding
Navy CESE requirements, acquisition, maintenance, reassignment,
replacement and disposal. It is tasked with control of this
equipment from "cradle to grave" as one CESO representative
described ito
Although it develops CESE requirements, CESO is not the
contracting agency for equipment buys. The requirements are
sent via Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) to
the following agencies for procurement:
Trucks less than 10,000 lbs. General Services Administration
Trucks greater than 10,000 lbs. U. S. Army
Construction Defense Construction Supply
C ent er
General Defense General Supply Center
Current policy is to specify commercial design equipment vice
tactical design. This ostensibly reduces procurement costs
and lead-time and, where such studies are made, should enhance
comparability to construction equipment used in industryo
Each type of CESE falls under one of ten P-1 lines
(listed in Appendix C) managed by a program manager who is the
replacement decision maker. He is fully knowledgeable of all
equipment in his P-1 line by USN number. NAVFAC requires each
manager to "ensure the active inventory objective is met, using
substitutes, interchangeability and retained overage assets in
addition to new procurements ..." [Ref o 21] Each manager,
then, is responsible for development of replacement requirements
which are the basis of the preliminary input to the annual budget.
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At the origin of this process is the development of
what is known as the Annual Allowance and Requirements Review
(AARR). This is a computer print-out which summarizes an allowance
holder's equipment on hand and considering equipment age iden-
tifies those CESE units which are eligible for replacement during
a given budget year. The allowance review is conducted by the
respective program manager and that activity's equipment officer.
Each unit is studied along with any other unit which warrants
replacement consideration as determined by the activity. The
result of the "negotiation" between the CESO and activity repre-
sentatives regarding which units are to be replaced and which
are to be retained overage is a prime factor in developing the
budget input.
Funds for equipment procurement are appropriated by P-1
line, and each program manager is authorized to manage those
funds among Inventory Objective requirements within his line.
A key to his management technique then is his ability to balance
his line holdings among NCF, Shore and PWRS assets. A replace-
ment problem facing some P-1 managers is that the average age
of Shore Activities equipment has moved steadily upward because
of higher priority NCF requirements several years ago resulting
from Vietnam. Forty-nine percentage of the overall Shore CESE
is overage in contrast to eight percentage for Active Forces
[Ref. iS]. Assuming funding shortfalls, the efforts to cure
the Shore problem will work to the detriment of the NCF average
age if management of funds is not finely tuned. The ability to
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utilize PWRS assets can definitely be advantageous. A primary-
tenet of CESO's current mission is to reduce the percentage of
CESE retained overage to an "acceptable level" which was
described by a CESO representative as 0^ over the long range.
The requisite capability and expertise is incumbent at CESO to
achieve this and progress has been noted. Unfortunately, factors
external to CESO impact heavily as will be noted in B below.
4. The Facilities Systems Office Computer (FACSO )
Equipment management is indeed a very complex task.
Every capability that can be marshalled should be applied in
order to increase effectiveness. Use of the computer can be
a definite asset in terms of compiling voluminous data and
subsequent analysis of that data. Although the industry repre-
sentatives contacted did not allude to major emphasis of computer
use in the area of equipment management, NAVEAC is currently
making valid inroads in this field. An overview of the system
to date is considered in order.
The necessity for a comprehensive data base Was noted
philosophically in Ref. 27, "The key to success in the PPBS
world (Flanning-Programm.ing-Budgeting System of the Department
of Defense) is the maintenance of a consistent data base. In
the past we have at times been at different places trying to
solve the same problem. This has been the source of most of
our difficulties. CESO and NAVFAC must work together to bring
that data base up to speed and then preserve it in a current
state. That data base includes procedures, philosophy, positions
on issues, etc., as well as raw numbers and factso"
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Such a data base is under development at NAVFAC's computer
facility, the Facilities Systems Office (FACSO). Unlike other
systems commands under the Chief of Naval Material whose data
bases are set up on an inter-command regional basis, NAVFAC main-
tains a central bank. In computer industry terminology, FACSO
is the central design agency and the data processing service
center for resources under NAVFAC, which includes CESE.
FACSO's equipment data bank, known as CASEMIS (Construction
Automotive Support Equipment Management Information System)
,
was developed with CESO to provide a single inventory, single
replacement, data bank. CASEMIS will afford control data from
registration to disposalo Three modules are planned:
a. Inventory and Registration
bo Planning, Programming and Budgeting
Co Operations and Maintenance
The first is currently being programmed and should be operational
by mid-1975 and the remaining two phases are planned for future
implementation [Refo 23]. The second phase appears particularly
relevant to the replacement problemo
Recognizing the future for such a system, its developers
at both FACSO and CESO claim the design of CASEMIS is flexible
enough to include future data needs whenever they become identi-
fied. CASET^IS v;as described as being "man-limited" as opposed
to being "machine-limited." It is therefore presumed that
storing and analyzing future data needs should pose no problems




The present program will include the following information
relevant to the replacement decision for each unit of CESE:
a. Age
b. Utilization
c. Labor hours and cost
d. Repair parts cost
60 Deployment record
f. Initial cost
g. Accumulated overhaul cost
ho Estimated replacement cost (based on current market
prices, this is updated at each AARR)o
Expanded data needs and the commensurate computer capability-
is considered a given. Appropriate planning seems currently
underway.
B. CONSTRAINTS ON THE SYSTEM
An autonomous organization is, by definition, not subject
to external regulation and guidance. Suffice it to say that
the construction equipment replacement decision in the Navy is
not made by an autonomous agent. Regulations or guidance
handed down are not normally done so with the intent to constrain
subordinates in a manner detrimental to the missiono At times,
however, certain tenets of policy seemingly run counter to the
benefit of a given decision or process.
lo Procurement Method
As a m^atter of general policy, the Department of Defense
(DOD) embraces the concepts known as "economic analysis" and
"program evaluation." The latter, which seems more relevant to
the equipment replacement decision, was defined in Ref . S as
a type of economic analysis of " . . . on-going actions to deter-
mine how best to improve an approved program/project based on
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actual performance • • • (It) focuses on approved programs and
projects to ensure that established goals and objectives are
being attained in the most cost-effective manner," It directed
a cost analysis of all alternatives available including main-
taining the status quo or doing nothing. It went on to note
that cost analysis should include all recurring operating costs
and comparisons of schedule and performanceo
Related to this is the concept known as Life Cycle
Costing (LCC) described in Ref, 9 as an acquisition technique
"
, • , which considers operating, maintenance and other costs
of ownership as well as acquisition price o , , The objective
is to insure that the equipment procured will result in the
lowest overall ownership cost to the Government during the
life of the equipment . o , LCC analysis should include all
anticipated expenditures directly or indirectly associated with
an alternative,"
The foregoing serves well to describe the philosophy
of the federal government regarding analysis supporting capital
investment. The problem is, however, that there is an over-
riding regulation which for all intents and purposes requires
that construction equipment be procured through formal advertising.
Thus it is that competitive bidding produces a lowest bidder
who will receive the award for new equipment. The Armed Services
Procurement Regulations (ASPR) allow procurement through
negotiation vice competitive bid under 17 excepting circumstances;
unfortunately, CESE normally does not qualify for any of these.
51

The reasons for government procurement by competitive bid
will not be discussed here. That formal advertising seems
counter to DOD's bent toward thorough economic analysis war-
rants further coverage.
First, the Uo S. Code (10 USC 2305 (c) ) notes that
competitive bids will be evaluated to determine the one "most
advantageous to the government, price and other factors con-
sidered" (emphasis added). Admittedly, the letter of the law
may intend for due consideration of all applicable factors.
In reality, the spirit of the law is construed to empahsize
the price. The lowest acquisition price in no way assures the
"most advantageous" alternative. In fact, sound management
requires the cost analysis over the long term not just the
price paid at buy time. As noted in Ref o 9, "one offeror's
equipment may cost less to buy but more to maintain and operate
over the length of time the item is programmed to remain in
the inventory." Consideration of durability, maintainability
and productivity is too easily precluded by formal advertising
and its inherent price emphasis.
Secondly, this procurement method is apt to affect a
construction equipment manager's approach to his analysis of
alternative buys. Just possibly he could perceive that such
analysis is futile because it will be pre-empted by the low-
price bidder. Thus, critical long-term factors become sub-
ordinate in the decision-maker's view.
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Finally procurement by formal advertising does not
permit the decision maker the capability to project a downstream
profile of his inventoryo The successful bidder during one
procurement may not receive the award on the follow-on contract
several years hence for the same type of equipment. This results
P in a mixed string of equipment which encompasses its own problems.
A one-make inventory is far and away the most effective to
manage. As noted in Chapter III, such factors as equipment
support magnify themselves considerably when the jobsite is
remote, as is so often the case for NCF deployments.
At present, there is virtually no means to control award
selection. This minimizes the desired effect that could be
achieved with economic analysis.
2, Budget Limitations
The idea of budget limitations is not new, nor is it
unique to Navy construction equipment replacement. It is a
fact of life and is at the heart of why scarce resources are
just thato Unlimited coffers would allow all to have every-
thing they wanted and eliminate the majority of reasons to ana-
lyze alternatives. There is, however, a problem confronting
Navy CESE managers in this regard. It is that it takes many
months after determination of requirements for notification of
what exact amount of funding will be appropriated, if any. The
impact can be at least twofold. One, during such a delay,
changes in requirements can be measurable. Secondly, each
ensuing month means that much more inflation. With a given
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amount of funds, a price increase dictates a quantity decrease.
These factors serve to enhance the need for economic analysis.
Reference 26 notes, ** . . • it may be argued that despite the
revealed economy in making replacements, (possibly) none will
be made because of unavailability of capital funds at a parti-
cular time. This does not mean that we should ignore the
problem; at worst, the case for replacement expenditures can
be strengthened and at best, when funds are available, they
can be spent in the most economical directions." In industry,
at least one construction company cited the equipment need
as the prime "driver" in the replacement process. In contrast,
as was noted by one Navy representative, funding is the driver
in the NCF arena.
In an effort to minimize the detrimental effect of
uncertainty regarding how much money will be appropriated yearly
for CESE replacement procurement, a concept known as Level
Funding Requirement (LRF) was inaugurated in late 1974. The
idea is to project several years into the future the' uniform
level of funding required to maintain an inventory of equip-
ment with 0^ overage. It is predicated on the belief that
identifying such a funding need over the long term will increase
the probability of Congressional funding at the desired dollar
level. It entails detailed planning and programming but that
is not considered unreasonable. It further requires determina-
tion of an overall turnover rate for a complete inventory, ten




An overall turnover rate of ten years . o • means
the average piece of CESE should not be in the system
more than ten years. Previous CESE budgets have been
justified on the amount of overage equipment that re-
quires replacement . , o A level funding concept is
based on the inventory objective and equipment turnover
rate rather than stressing the dollars required to
replace overage equipment. The turnover rate for
CESE is ten years and if we are able to replace one-
tenth of the inventory every year for ten years we
will achieve a situation where approximately 10^
of the CESE becomes overage each year, thus elimi-
nating the problems of (1) high maintenance costs
associated with an inventory 40^ (Navywide) retained
overage assets and (2) volatile annual dollar re-
quirements needed to replace overage equipment.
With a $717 million inventory and iS^ inflation
the LFR for FY-76 equals
^f±f
^ (l.lS) = $84.6 M
10
LFR ostensibly determines beforehand the amount of
money to be appropriated. By dealing with this uncertainty in




The federal funding system classifies monies appropriated
by functional use. As might be expected, specific use of an
appropriation is rigidly regulated; application of the funds
for some use other than specified by Congress is prohibited.
There are two appropriations relevant to Navy CESE management.
Because funding top management's interest in their particular
appropriation seems to override their concern for overall cost-
effectiveness, a problem exists which is, perhaps, unnecessary
»
The two appropriations involved are entitled Other
Procurement, Navy (OPN) and Operations & Maintenance, Navy (O&MN).
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The former is the acquisition money, the procurement cost to
replace equipment retired from inventory. The latter pays for
the recurring costs, the operating and maintenance funds to keep
a unit producing [Ref. 24]. The problem perceived is that
the OPN and O&MN managers are decentralized and separate analysis
of the two funds is conducted o This results naturally in an
emphasis by OPN personnel to minimize procurement prices and
O&MN managers stressing minimal operating and maintenance
costs. Achieving both, of course, would approach an optimal
solutiono In actuality, however, the least expensive to buy
can be the most costly to operate. Because OPN and O&MN funds
cannot be comingled, the vested interests remain dichotomized.
The net effect is that the CESE decision maker who is tasked
with managing both types of funds at his low-level probably
recognizes the problem but is unable to solve it; his analysis
cannot incorporate the combined (OPN, O&MN) long term effects
in guiding his replacement decision. If, as stressed by ASPR,
total overall cost is the true benchmark, combined analysis
of all funding involved must be effectively achieved.
One other peripheral point was noted by a CESO represen-
tative. Funds received from disposal of retired equipment do
not revert back to the Navy and therefore are not available
for equipment replacement due to funding regulations. Accord-





As alluded to in previous chapters, capital equipment re-
placement whether accomplished in industry or the Navy has
many common aspects. The goal is the same; the players and
sometimes the rules are different. Quite similar to those
definitions quoted in Chapter III, DOD's concept of economic
life of a capital investment is " o . . the period of time
over which the benefits to be gained from a project may reason-
ably be expected to accrue ... it is limited by its physical
life and further limited by its technological life." [Ref. 10]
However, differences were noted in the approach to the criteria
used in making equipment replacement determinations.
Ic The Emphasis on Age
When the writer inquired specifically as to what criteria
were used in CESE replacement decisions, the CESO representatives
in a very straightforward manner cited only two: age and judgment,
with age the basic one. The same reasons for using age discussed
in the Theoretical/Commercial chapter apply equally well to Navy
use: its explicit and finite nature, its ease of measurement.
Likewise as discussed, the traits inherent in the specific defi-
nition of "age** in a given process also warrant attention in
the Navy arena.
In mid-1974 CESO developed life expectancies for each
equipment type which it calls "Seabee Life" and upon which future
replacement requirements are based:
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Seabee Life = Years in PWRS + DOD Field Life
Based on anticipated life determined by DOD on a depart-
ment-wide basis.
(If the calculation noted above was greater than the years
parts support could be effectively rendered by the equip-
ment manufacturer, the parts support period would become
the "Seabee Life" for that unit.)
The formula accomplished two important functions. One, it
explicitly noted the unique characteristic pertaining to the
amount of storage time in the mobilization inventory. Secondly,
it duly noted the DOD equipment life criteria.
There can be little doubt that age is the basis of the
Navy equipment replacement processo It is the base-line, the
start-point of replacement deliberations. Other criteria are
indeed secondary.
2, Other Criteria
These other secondary criteria which are considered in
the replacement decision are discussed below. The reader should
not infer that all factors cited herein are a part of every
decision; certainly that is not the case.
a. Usage
Depending on the type of machine, usage is measured
in either hours or miles. It is often the sister criteria to
age in automotive replacement tables, e.g., "six years or 72,000
miles." In discussions with CESO representatives, the writer
noted that usage is a significant factor only in extreme cases
where use of a given equipment was very low or very high relative
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to its age. Obviously, high use was a factor in favor of
replacement and conversely.
b. Extensive Repair
Unexpected replacement deliberations are precipitated
upon the occurrence of traumatic accidents with equipment as
noted in Chapter III. The decision to incur extensive repair
costs must be made deliberately and as a matter of policy
operating units are required to defer to the judgment of CESO
when repair costs reach certain magnitudes relative to the equip-
ment's acquisition cost. A factor for age is also cranked into
the deliberation.
In further elaboration to the two aforementioned
criteria, a recent U. S. Air Force action is worth noting. Prior
to Fiscal Year 1968 (FY6B) the USAF recommended replacement of
motor vehicles when any one of the following three criteria
were exceeded: age, miles or one time repair cost. In response
to a Congressional funding review, replacement was changed to
a dual criterion of either age and miles or age and 'one-time
repair cost for FY6S through FY71. The findings determined
that " . , o changing to the dual criteria had contributed to
the present (deterioration) problems in the fleet status.
Operating and maintenance costs for administrative-use vehicles,
for example, increased over $110 per vehicle." [Ref . 1] This
seemed to indicate that subordination of some criteria to age




Even though each and every CESE replacement is
handled on a unit-by-unit basis, the inventory is also managed
on an "equipment family" basiso Accordingly, some units of
equipment that otherwise might qualify for replacement may be
deferred a year or so to make up a quantity buy. This may
result in a volume price break but it may also produce block
aging.
do Need and Flexibility
The CESE manager's approach to the requirement for
the equipment is based not so much on specific NCF deployment
projects as on the capability to be maintained in readiness
to support contingency plans « The net result is that require-
ment considerations at replacement time are slanted in the
direction of general, i.eo, flexibility, vice specific use,
e. Maintainability
This factor is not specifically considered in the
replacement process. In interviews with CESO personnel concerned
with the specific subject of equipment maintenance, recommendations
were noted to include such a considerationo In this regard there
is a Maintenance Management Information System (MAINTMIS) under
development and is expected to be an appendage to CASEMIS indica-
ting that sometime in the future maintenance factors can be





The concept of obsolescence was broached by several
Navy equipment personnel in a manner which indicated it is a
criteria which is not used. One CESO representative noted,
"Obsolescence is no factor due to Seabees wearing equipment out
before it can become obsolete," Sutley noted in Refo 12,
"Obsolescence , , , is impossible to forecast much in advance
of its occurrence . o , St at e-of-the-Art advancements in con-
struction equipment have historically been slow," This type
of rationale plus the lack of forces competing for the NCF mission
seems to negate the need for Navy CESE managers to consider
obsolescence,
g. Salvage Value
For reasons cited in Section B above, salvage or
resale value of equipment is not a replacement consideration
as noted by CESO representatives. Unless funding regulations
are changed drastically, such a consideration is not foreseen
as likelyo
It is noted then that while other criteria besides
age may apply to the Navy equipment replacement decision, their




Notwithstanding the amount of attention which was devoted
to the theoretical and commercial considerations of replacing
construction equipment, the primary interest remains an appraisal
of the Navy approacho Accordingly, observations and recommenda-
tions set forth herein are so orientedo
A. OBSERVATIONS
Several observations on the subject of Navy construction
equipment management were noted which are significant in the
writer's mind as this finalization is set to paper to warrant
mention. The first is the thesis subject itself: replacement
of Navy construction equipment i_s based on one primary criterion—
age. Other criteria were noted but their inclusion in the
replacement analysis appears the exception rather than the rule.
Thus, the existence of a single replacement criterion is con-
sidered as real in the final stages as it was apparent in the
initial one. It is opined that while the present system is
effective, it could be improved.
A positive observation relates to the centralized organiza-
tion developed to manage the CESE inventory. The organization,
personnel and facilities appear amply capable of achieving their
mission. The management for such an extensive and scattered
inventory is effectively centralized yet apparently responsive
to its many customers. CESO personnel are considered by the
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writer to be experienced, objective, and professional. The
facilities at their disposal, primarily the FACSO computer bank,
seem second to none. Nothing required for optimal equipment
management seems to be lacking at CESO.
Another phenomenon noted was the recognition of the need
to solve equipment problems on a long-term basis. Admittedly,
impetus in this direction has originated above CESO and even
NAVFAC in the form of such things as PPBS and LFR. Nevertheless,
the approach to such policies at CESO was observed to be positive,
recognizing the beneficial long-range aspects.
One other positive action observed was the process of rotating
new equipment through PWRSo The writer is unaware of the reasoning
which initiated this technique but considers it an exercise of
alert management. The atmosphere of constrained budgeting which
precluded appropriation of funds to upgrade mobilization stocks
while at the time not allowing replacement of active force support
equipment as needed presented a two-edged sword. The concept
presently followed which transfers newly acquired unused equip-
ment from PWRS inventory to operating forces as brand new, like
units that enter stock as replacements solves both problems.
That represents the type of imaginative management required under
the current state of limited resources.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the research and information gathered in preparation
of this thesis, four recommendations are presented belowo In
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keeping with the intent to present a paper that is not just
theoretical but also has some "real-world" relevance, the writer
notes that only the first three recommendations are attainable.
The last one would require something akin to major surgery of
the federal system; thus, it is considered possible but not
in the least bit probable.
1. Six Valid Criteria Are Relevant
Age, Usage, One-Time Repair Costs, Maintainability,
Productivity and Resale Value are recommended herewith as criteria
which should be explicitly considered in a Navy construction
equipment replacement decision.
The term "explicitly consider" does not infer that all
six criteria will affect replacement in each final analysis.
It does mean that each criterion should be considered at the
outset of deliberations. To a varying degree the six are meas-
urable, analyzable and relevant.
Prescribing five other criteria as potential coequals
to that of age is not intended to subordinate the continual close
look at that factor, such as the analysis which v/as the basis
of the development of "Seabee Life." To the contrary, it is
analysis of this type which leads to a better understanding of
the entire process.
It is recognized that "instant relevance" cannot be
achieved in regards to a development of a multiple-criterion.
Accordingly, it is considered that an appropriate approach would
be to gather data pertaining to a major equipment family and
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Ithrough a process such as sensitivity analysis develop criteria
relationships o It is further recognized that development and
evaluation of even pilot programs would take years. In addition,
varying factors such as equipment makes, models and uses need
to be normalized, With the computer processing capability and
storage capacity available at FACSO, such analysis is not beyond
reason. It is a foregone conclusion that the funding constraints
on NCF equipment, particularly in peacetime, will continue to
tighten; better management techniques will be necessary to meet
the challenge,
2, An Effective Management Information System is Necessary
Because of the magnitude of the capital investment of
the NCF construction equipment inventory and the complexity of
the factors inherent in its sound management, it is recommended
that the development of a comprehensive equipment information
system be aggressively pursued.
The CASEMIS data bank represents the type of approach
necessary. Presently in an embryonic stage, it shows great
potentialo That potential will lie dormant, however, without
dynamic personnel to push its further development. These per-
sonnel are of two types: computer-oriented and CESE-oriented,
It is considered that the impetus to full development must by
necessity be provided by the CESE people. This will involve
removal of some personnel inertia in convincing equipment managers
that CASEMIS can be an extremely valuable tool to them. As
users of the finished system, their contribution to its development
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can and should be significant. It is human nature for an indi-
vidual to make more effective use of a system he helped develop.
This applies to both design of the data-storage system and of
analysis programs to assist them in their equipment decisions.
Data, of course, should not be stored for storage sake.
It has no value if it is not used and analyzed by management.
A Secretary of the Navy Instruction noted "replacement decisions
are concerned with only future value . Neither the equipment's
original cost nor the vehicle's past maintenance cost is a con-
trolling factor" (emphasis added) [Refo 29] o This reflects,
of course, the sunk cost concept. This writer, however, takes
exception to this to a degree. It is considered that the con-
cept of analysis v/hich develops relationships would be more
beneficial if it provides also a look backward. Something can
be learned from past performance and effective analysis should
provide a means to compare planned output to actual.
3o Procurement Method Should Be Compatible With Emphasis
On Economic Analysis
It is recommended that as economic analysis continues to
be emphasized by DOD, a procurement method more compatible than
the Formal Advertising method currently used be adopted for con-
struction equipment acquisition.
Contracts awarded through Formal Advertising usually
go to the lowest bidder; the basis of replacement equipment
selection is the lowest acquisition price. This is in accordance
with regulations. Running somewhat counter to this is DOD
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policy stating that capital investments should be subjected to
economic analysis to determine the total life costs to the
government. The latter seems to home in on the cost-effective-
ness issue much more closely than the former. Conducting the
extensive analysis required to develop a valid ranking of alterna-
tives seems a futile exerciseo Low price will override all
elseo
It appears to the writer that a more effective procure-
ment method would be analysis of the alternatives based on a
Life Cycle Costing (LCC) or similar, issue Requests for Pro-
posals (RFP) and negotiate. ASPR cites 17 exceptions to Formal
Advertising that may be procured through Negotiationo Exception
(13) allows negotiation for *' , , , equipment which (the
Secretary of the Navy) determines to be technical equipment
whose standardization and the interchangeability of whose parts
are necessary in the public interest and whose procurement by
negotiation is necessary to assure that standardization and
interchangeability," [Ref • 4] It further requires that the
equipment be for tactical use at advanced or detached bases
(among others), that the exception determination be reviewed
at least biannually, that the exception be applied only to sub-
sequent or follow-on purchases (vice initial buys) and that a
recurring requirement for the equipment exists. It is con-
sidered that Seabee construction equipment meets these criteria.
Justification for Secretarial approval to procure particularly




4. Procurement (OPN) and Operating (O&MN) Costs Should
Be Combined To Analyze Them Corporately
It is recommended that a method be developed to combine
OPN and O&MN cost analysis to achieve an overall low cost.
This recommendation is related to third-order-head Three
above in that both seek to improve the viability of analysis in
the procurement process. It was apparent to the writer that
the parochiality of the managers of the two types of funds,
while earnestly intending to achieve what is best in their area
of responsibility, could be working to the detriment of the
achievement of true overall cost-effectiveness. To circumvent
this. Navy top management would have to endorse combined costs
examination at the lower procurement m.anagement levels, something
not now achievable
o
The problem discussed is a dynamic one, subject to
varying factors from both the construction aspects and other
factors from external sources, like Congress and the economy.
It is because of its dynamic dimension that managing Navy CESE
will never be subject to a final, optimal methodo Like all
management, astute judgment, art as well as science, and focused
thinking must play their part to achieve sound decisions hereo
It is concluded that while Navy construction equipment is
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